Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? [electronic resource] : An Empirical Investigation / Detragiache, Enrica

By: Detragiache, EnricaContributor(s): Detragiache, EnricaMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1999Description: 1 online resource (42 p.)Subject(s): Asset Portfolio | Asset Quality | Bank Asset | Bank Depos Banking Crises | Banking Market | Banking Sector | Banking System | Banks and Banking Reform | Central Bank | Currencies and Exchange Rates | Debt Markets | Depos Deposit Insurance | Depositor | Depositors | Deposits | Developing Countries | Emerging Markets | Finance and Financial Sector Development | Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring | Financial Intermediation | Financial Literacy | Insurance and Risk Mitigation | Insurance Law | Law and Development | Liquidity | Loan | Monetary Fund | Moral Hazard | National Bank | Private Sector DevelopmentAdditional physical formats: Detragiache, Enrica.: Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak; Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org or edetragiache@imf.org.
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Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak; Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org or edetragiache@imf.org.

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