Detragiache, Enrica
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation / Detragiache, Enrica [electronic resource] : Detragiache, Enrica - Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1999 - 1 online resource (42 p.) - Policy research working papers. World Bank e-Library. .
Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak; Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org or edetragiache@imf.org.
10.1596/1813-9450-2247
Asset Portfolio
Asset Quality
Bank Asset
Bank Depos Banking Crises
Banking Market
Banking Sector
Banking System
Banks and Banking Reform
Central Bank
Currencies and Exchange Rates
Debt Markets
Depos Deposit Insurance
Depositor
Depositors
Deposits
Developing Countries
Emerging Markets
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring
Financial Intermediation
Financial Literacy
Insurance and Risk Mitigation
Insurance Law
Law and Development
Liquidity
Loan
Monetary Fund
Moral Hazard
National Bank
Private Sector Development
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation / Detragiache, Enrica [electronic resource] : Detragiache, Enrica - Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1999 - 1 online resource (42 p.) - Policy research working papers. World Bank e-Library. .
Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak; Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org or edetragiache@imf.org.
10.1596/1813-9450-2247
Asset Portfolio
Asset Quality
Bank Asset
Bank Depos Banking Crises
Banking Market
Banking Sector
Banking System
Banks and Banking Reform
Central Bank
Currencies and Exchange Rates
Debt Markets
Depos Deposit Insurance
Depositor
Depositors
Deposits
Developing Countries
Emerging Markets
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring
Financial Intermediation
Financial Literacy
Insurance and Risk Mitigation
Insurance Law
Law and Development
Liquidity
Loan
Monetary Fund
Moral Hazard
National Bank
Private Sector Development