Central Bank Boards Around the World [electronic resource] : Why Does Membership Size Differ? / Helge Berger.
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TextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 06/281Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006Description: 1 online resource (46 p.)ISBN: 1451865414 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Central Bank | Committee | Council | Decision Making | Inflation | Monetary Fund | Bulgaria | New ZealandAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Central Bank Boards Around the World : Why Does Membership Size Differ?Online resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
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