Berger, Helge.

Central Bank Boards Around the World Why Does Membership Size Differ? / Helge Berger. [electronic resource] : Helge Berger. - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006. - 1 online resource (46 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 06/281 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 06/281 .

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

1451865414 : 18.00 USD

1018-5941

10.5089/9781451865417.001 doi


Central Bank
Committee
Council
Decision Making
Inflation
Monetary Fund


Bulgaria
New Zealand

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