A Delicate Equilibrium [electronic resource] : Debt Relief and Default Penalties in an International Context.
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TextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 89/10Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1989Description: 1 online resource (28 p.)ISBN: 1451926421 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Debt Contracts | Debt Relief | Equation | Probability Distribution | Probability | ArgentinaAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: A Delicate Equilibrium : Debt Relief and Default Penalties in an International ContextOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: Debt relief and penalties are discussed in connection with sovereign-country loans. We focus on conditions for the existence of penalties that are too low for ensuring Pareto efficiency, and show the possible time inconsistency of optimal debt contracts. A methodology for ascertaining debt relief implicit in international loans is outlined.
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Debt relief and penalties are discussed in connection with sovereign-country loans. We focus on conditions for the existence of penalties that are too low for ensuring Pareto efficiency, and show the possible time inconsistency of optimal debt contracts. A methodology for ascertaining debt relief implicit in international loans is outlined.
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