A Delicate Equilibrium Debt Relief and Default Penalties in an International Context. [electronic resource] : - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1989. - 1 online resource (28 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 89/10 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 89/10 .

Debt relief and penalties are discussed in connection with sovereign-country loans. We focus on conditions for the existence of penalties that are too low for ensuring Pareto efficiency, and show the possible time inconsistency of optimal debt contracts. A methodology for ascertaining debt relief implicit in international loans is outlined.

1451926421 : 10.00 USD

1018-5941

10.5089/9781451926422.001 doi


Debt Contracts
Debt Relief
Equation
Probability Distribution
Probability


Argentina

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