Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game [electronic resource] / Eduardo Ley.
Material type:
TextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 02/81Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002Description: 1 online resource (13 p.)ISBN: 1451850379 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Bargaining | Bayesian Analysis | Bayesian Inference | Contract Curve | Game Theory and Bargaining Theory | Nash Bargaining SolutionAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Statistical Inference as a Bargaining GameOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
Description based on print version record.
There are no comments on this title.