Ley, Eduardo.
Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game Eduardo Ley. [electronic resource] / Eduardo Ley. - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. - 1 online resource (13 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 02/81 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 02/81 .
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
1451850379 : 15.00 USD
1018-5941
10.5089/9781451850376.001 doi
Bargaining
Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian Inference
Contract Curve
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Nash Bargaining Solution
Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game Eduardo Ley. [electronic resource] / Eduardo Ley. - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002. - 1 online resource (13 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 02/81 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 02/81 .
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
1451850379 : 15.00 USD
1018-5941
10.5089/9781451850376.001 doi
Bargaining
Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian Inference
Contract Curve
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Nash Bargaining Solution