Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures and Table -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- Some Hypothetical Crises -- Mutual Mistrust Is Likely to Characterize a Cybercrisis -- States May Have Room for Maneuver in a Cybercrisis -- A Note on Methodology -- Purpose and Organization -- CHAPTER TWO Avoiding Crises by Creating Norms -- What Kind of Norms Might Be Useful? -- Enforce Laws Against Hacking -- Dissociate from Freelance Hackers -- Discourage Commercial Espionage -- Be Careful About the Obligation to Suppress Cybertraffic -- How Do We Enforce Norms? -- Confidence-Building Measures -- Norms for Victims of Cyberattacks -- Norms for War -- Deception -- Military Necessity and Collateral Damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER THREE Narratives, Dialogue, and Signals -- Narratives to Promote Control -- A Narrative Framework for Cyberspace -- Victimization, Attribution, Retaliation, and Aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: Narratives to Walk Back a Crisis -- "We Did Nothing" -- "Well, At Least Not on Our Orders" -- "It Was an Accident" -- "This Is Nothing New" -- "At Least It Does Not Portend Anything" -- Broader Considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in Signaling -- Signaling Resolve -- Signaling That Cybercombat Is Not Kinetic Combat -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER FOUR Escalation Management -- Motives for Escalation -- Does Escalation Matter? -- Escalation Risks -- Escalation Risks in Phase 0 -- Escalation Risks for Contained Local Conflicts -- Escalation Risks for Uncontained Conflicts -- Managing Proxy Cyberattacks -- What Hidden Combatants Imply for Horizontal Escalation -- Managing Overt Proxy Conflict -- The Difficulties of Tit-for-Tat Management -- The Importance of Preplanning.

Disjunctions Among Effort, Effect, and Perception -- Inadvertent Escalation -- Escalation into Kinetic Warfare -- Escalation into Economic Warfare -- Sub-Rosa Escalation -- Managing the Third-Party Problem -- The Need for a Clean Shot -- Inference and Narrative -- Command and Control -- Commanders -- Those They Command -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER FIVE Implications for Strategic Stability -- Translating Sources of Cold War Instability to Cyberspace -- What Influence Can Cyberwar Have If Nuclear Weapons Exist? -- Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Nuclear Capabilities? -- Can a Cyberattack Disarm a Target State's Cyberwarriors? -- Does Cyberwar Lend Itself to Alert-Reaction Cycles? -- Are Cyberdefenses Inherently Destabilizing? -- Would a Cyberspace Arms Race Be Destabilizing? -- Surprise Attack as a Source of Instability -- Misperception as a Source of Crisis -- One Side Takes Great Exception to Cyberespionage -- Defenses Are Misinterpreted as Preparations for War -- Too Much Confidence in Attribution -- Too Much Confidence in or Fear of Preemption -- Supposedly Risk-Free Cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- CHAPTER SIX Can Cybercrises Be Managed? -- APPENDIXES -- A. Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks -- B. Overt, Obvious, and Covert Cyberattacks and Responses -- C. Can Good Cyberdefenses Discourage Attacks? -- Bibliography.

The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace--the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step in, controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and recognizing escalation risks.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.