000			04216nam a22004813i 4500
001			EBC491733
003			MiAaPQ
005			20181121153907.0
006			m o d |
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			181113s2003 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780313059582 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780275978273
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC491733
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL491733
035			_a(CaPaEBR)ebr10156272
035			_a(CaONFJC)MIL242719
035			_a(OCoLC)143109315
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aKF8736.C64 2003eb
082	0		_a347.7326
100	1		_aComparato, Scott A.
245	1	0	_aAmici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts.
264		1	_aWestport : _bABC-CLIO, LLC, _c2003.
264		4	_c©2003.
300			_a1 online resource (191 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aNon-Ser.
505	0		_aCover -- Title Page -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1 Amici Curiae and State Supreme Court Justices -- CHAPTER 2 Theories of Judicial and Interest Group Behavior -- CHAPTER 3 Examining Litigant and Amicus Briefs -- CHAPTER 4 Litigants, Amici Curiae, and Strategic Behavior -- CHAPTER 5 Information and State Supreme Court Decision Making -- CHAPTER 6 Conclusion -- APPENDIX The Negative Binomial Regression Model -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author.
520			_aApplying strategic approaches to both interest groups as amici curiae and state supreme court justices, Comparato investigates the influence of judicial retention methods and the ballot initiative on their behaivor. The results demonstrate that they behave strategically, attempting to achieve their goals within the confines of the institutional setting. What impact do state-level institutions have on the behavior of state supreme court justices and interest groups participating as amici curiae in those courts? Specifically, is the information provided by interest groups conditioned on the judicial retention system, or whether the state uses the ballot initiative, and does that information impact the decision-making process of the justices? Comparato answers these questions by employing strategic theories of judicial and group behavior, with groups motivated by the attainment of policy and group maintenance, and state supreme court justices motivated by policy and the continued maintenance of their position on the court. He argues that the information provided in amicus curiae briefs allows both groups and state supreme court justices to achieve their respective goals. In order to answer these questions, Comparto analyzes litigant and amicus curiae briefs as well as judicial decisions from seven state supreme courts to evaluate the effects of state-level institutions on the types of information provided to state supreme court justices, and how those justices respond to that information. The results suggest that interest groups do behave strategically, providing information to justices that they believe will be useful in helping the justices retain their seats on the court and achieve their desired policy outcomes. There is also support for the expectation that the information provided by litigants and amici, as well as the retention method, have a
520	8		_adirect impact on the decision-making of justices.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aAmici curiae -- United States.
650		0	_aCourts of last resort -- United States -- States.
650		0	_aJudicial process -- United States.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aComparato, Scott A. _tAmici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts _dWestport : ABC-CLIO, LLC,c2003 _z9780275978273
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
830		0	_aNon-Ser.
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/buse-ebooks/detail.action?docID=491733 _zClick to View
999			_c72280 _d72280