000			02421cam a22003494a 4500
001			6179
003			The World Bank
006			m d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			020129s2012 dcu i001 0 eng
024	8		_a10.1596/1813-9450-6179
035			_a(The World Bank)6179
100	1		_aKeefer, Philip
245	1	0	_aWhy Follow the Leader? _h[electronic resource] : _bCollective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict / _cPhilip Keefer
260			_aWashington, D.C., _bThe World Bank, _c2012
300			_a1 online resource (24 p.)
520	3		_aMost analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians: leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by which state capacity is created and a specific reason to regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest.
650		4	_aArmed Conflict
650		4	_aCivil war
650		4	_aCollective action
650		4	_aConflict
650		4	_aCredible commitment
650		4	_aInternational Terrorism & Counterterrorism
650		4	_aLabor Policies
650		4	_aMacroeconomics and Economic Growth
650		4	_aPeace & Peacekeeping
650		4	_aPost Conflict Reconstruction
700	1		_aKeefer, Philip
776	1	8	_aPrint version: _iKeefer, Philip _tWhy Follow the Leader? _dWashington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2012
830		0	_aPolicy research working papers.
830		0	_aWorld Bank e-Library.
856	4	0	_uhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6179
999			_c24674 _d24674