000			02030cam a22003734a 4500
001			6146
003			The World Bank
006			m d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			020129s2012 dcu i001 0 eng
024	8		_a10.1596/1813-9450-6146
035			_a(The World Bank)6146
100	1		_aCole, Shawn
245	1	0	_aIncentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking _h[electronic resource] : _bEvidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers / _cShawn Cole
260			_aWashington, D.C., _bThe World Bank, _c2012
300			_a1 online resource (68 p.)
520	3		_aThis paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. The paper first shows that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by loan officers. Second, the paper presents direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
650		4	_aAccess to Finance
650		4	_aBanking
650		4	_aBankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
650		4	_aBanks & Banking Reform
650		4	_aDebt Markets
650		4	_aEmerging markets
650		4	_aFinance and Financial Sector Development
650		4	_aLoan officer incentives
650		4	_aMicrofinance
650		4	_aPrivate Sector Development
700	1		_aCole, Shawn
700	1		_aKanz, Martin
700	1		_aKlapper, Leora
776	1	8	_aPrint version: _iCole, Shawn _tIncentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking. _dWashington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2012
830		0	_aPolicy research working papers.
830		0	_aWorld Bank e-Library.
856	4	0	_uhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6146
999			_c24641 _d24641