000			02065nam a22003974a 4500
001			WPIEA2042001
003			IMF
005			20190405161620.0
006			m o d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			020129s2001 dcu o i00 0 eng d
020			_a1451874502 : _c15.00 USD
020			_z9781451874501
022			_a1018-5941
024	7		_a10.5089/9781451874501.001 _2doi
035			_a(IMF)WPIEA2042001
040			_aDcWaIMF _beng
100	1		_aChan-Lau, Jorge A.
245	1	4	_aThe Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt _h[electronic resource] / _cJorge A Chan-Lau.
260			_aWashington, D.C. : _bInternational Monetary Fund, _c2001.
300			_a1 online resource (12 p.)
490	1		_aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; _vNo. 01/204
520	3		_aThis paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		7	_aAgency Cost of Debt _2imf
650		7	_aCorporate Finance and Governance _2imf
650		7	_aCorporate Governance Structures _2imf
650		7	_aEquation _2imf
650		7	_aExit Decision _2imf
650		7	_aShareholder _2imf
651		7	_aJapan _2imf
651		7	_aKorea, Republic of _2imf
776	0	8	_iPrint Version: _aChan-Lau, Jorge A. _tThe Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt _dWashington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. _z9781451874501
830		0	_aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; _vNo. 01/204
856	4	0	_uhttp://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07060-9781451874501/07060-9781451874501/07060-9781451874501.xml _zIMF e-Library
856	4	0	_uhttp://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/9781451874501 _zIMF Book Store
999			_c150594 _d150594