000			02159nam a22004094a 4500
001			WPIEA0771991
003			IMF
005			20190405152929.0
006			m o d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			020129s1991 dcu o i00 0 eng d
020			_a1451849915 : _c15.00 USD
020			_z9781451849912
022			_a1018-5941
024	7		_a10.5089/9781451849912.001 _2doi
035			_a(IMF)WPIEA0771991
040			_aDcWaIMF _beng
100	1		_aCalvo, Guillermo.
245	1	0	_aExchange-Rate-Based Stabilization under Imperfect Credibility _h[electronic resource] / _cGuillermo Calvo.
260			_aWashington, D.C. : _bInternational Monetary Fund, _c1991.
300			_a1 online resource (34 p.)
490	1		_aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; _vNo. 91/77
520	3		_aThis paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		7	_aExchange Rate _2imf
650		7	_aInflation Rate _2imf
650		7	_aNominal Interest Rate _2imf
650		7	_aReal Exchange Rate _2imf
651		7	_aArgentina _2imf
651		7	_aChile _2imf
651		7	_aIsrael _2imf
651		7	_aUruguay _2imf
700	1		_aVégh Gramont, Carlos A.
776	0	8	_iPrint Version: _aCalvo, Guillermo. _tExchange-Rate-Based Stabilization under Imperfect Credibility _dWashington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1991. _z9781451849912
830		0	_aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; _vNo. 91/77
856	4	0	_uhttp://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02214-9781451849912/02214-9781451849912/02214-9781451849912.xml _zIMF e-Library
856	4	0	_uhttp://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/9781451849912 _zIMF Book Store
999			_c147470 _d147470