| 000 | 02757cam a22005654a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 5427 | ||
| 003 | The World Bank | ||
| 006 | m d | ||
| 007 | cr cn||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 020129s2010 dcu i001 0 eng | ||
| 024 | 8 | _a10.1596/1813-9450-5427 | |
| 035 | _a(The World Bank)5427 | ||
| 100 | 1 | _aCarpena, Fenella | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aLiability structure in small-scale finance _h[electronic resource] : _bevidence from a natural experimen / _cCarpena, Fenella |
| 260 |
_aWashington, D.C., _bThe World Bank, _c2010 |
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| 300 | _a1 online resource (34 p.) | ||
| 520 | 3 | _aMicrofinance, the provision of small individual and business loans, has witnessed dramatic growth, reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide. Much of its success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending. Yet, very little is known about the optimal contract structure of such loans - there is substantial variation across lenders, even within a particular setting. This paper exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability structure offered by a microfinance program in India, which shifted from individual to group liability lending. The analysis finds compelling evidence that contract structure matters: for the same borrower, required monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to be missed under the group liability setting, relative to individual liability. In addition, compulsory savings deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under group liability contracts. | |
| 650 | 4 | _aAccess to Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | _aBankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | |
| 650 | 4 | _aBorrower | |
| 650 | 4 | _aCollateral | |
| 650 | 4 | _aCommercial banks | |
| 650 | 4 | _aDebt Markets | |
| 650 | 4 | _aDeposit Insurance | |
| 650 | 4 | _aEmerging markets | |
| 650 | 4 | _aExpenditure | |
| 650 | 4 | _aFinance and Financial Sector Development | |
| 650 | 4 | _aFinancial market | |
| 650 | 4 | _aFinancial support | |
| 650 | 4 | _aIncome inequality | |
| 650 | 4 | _aInformation asymmetries | |
| 650 | 4 | _aInternational bank | |
| 650 | 4 | _aLenders | |
| 650 | 4 | _aLiability | |
| 650 | 4 | _aLoan | |
| 650 | 4 | _aMicrocredit | |
| 650 | 4 | _aMicrofinance | |
| 650 | 4 | _aOptimal contract | |
| 650 | 4 | _aProvision of credit | |
| 650 | 4 | _aSavings deposits | |
| 650 | 4 | _aTransaction | |
| 650 | 4 | _aTransaction costs | |
| 700 | 1 | _aCarpena, Fenella | |
| 700 | 1 | _aCole, Shawn | |
| 700 | 1 | _aShapiro, Jeremy | |
| 700 | 1 | _aZia, Bilal | |
| 776 | 1 | 8 |
_aPrint version: _iCarpena, Fenella. _tLiability structure in small-scale finance. _dWashington, D.C., The World Bank, 2010 |
| 830 | 0 | _aPolicy research working papers. | |
| 830 | 0 | _aWorld Bank e-Library. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5427 |
| 999 |
_c141186 _d141186 |
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