E-Physicalism : A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.

By: Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo JMaterial type: TextTextSeries: Phenomenology and Mind SerPublisher: Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, Inc., 2013Copyright date: ©2012Description: 1 online resource (216 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783110325560Subject(s): Consciousness | MaterialismGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: E-Physicalism : A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal ConsciousnessDDC classification: 126 LOC classification: B825.V45 2012ebOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Intro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1: A PHYSICALIST APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS -- 1.0 Introduction -- 1.1 Consciousness and "what it is like" -- 1.2 Realism about consciousness -- 1.2.1 Eliminativism -- 1.2.2 The problem of consciousness -- 1.3 Physicalism about consciousness -- 1.3.1 Physical items -- 1.3.2 Supervenience -- 1.4 The mind/body duality -- 1.5 Minds and bodies -- 1.5.1 Mind-body causal relations -- 1.5.2 Epiphenomenalism -- 1.5.3 Monism -- 1.6 Panpsychism -- 1.6.1 The combination problem -- 1.6.2 Panpsychism and neuroscience -- 1.7 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 2: STRONG AI AND COMPUTATIONALISM -- 2.0 Introduction -- 2.1 Strong AI -- 2.1.1 Conscious behaviour -- 2.1.2 Consciousness and behaviour -- 2.2 Computational functionalism -- 2.2.1 Functionalism and consciousness -- 2.2.2 Functions and information -- 2.3 The internal character of consciousness -- 2.4 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 3: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS -- 3.0 Introduction -- 3.1 Higher-order representation theories of consciousness -- 3.2 The unity of consciousness -- 3.3 The explanatory gap -- 3.3.1 Subjectivity and reality -- 3.3.2 Intersubjective accessibility -- 3.4 The homunculus fallacy -- 3.5 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 4: SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY -- 4.0 Introduction -- 4.1 Supervenience and ontology -- 4.2 Consciousness and supervenience -- 4.3 Microphysicalism -- 4.4 The levels of reality -- 4.5 Emergence -- 4.6 The case for emergence -- 4.6.1 The kinetic theory of gases -- 4.6.2 The EPR Paradox and Bell's theorem -- 4.6.3 Microphysicalism and nonlocality -- 4.7 Emergence laws -- 4.8 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 5: E-PHYSICALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS -- 5.0 Introduction -- 5.1 Experiencers -- 5.2 The possible worlds strategy -- 5.2.1 Physical and metaphysical possibility.
5.2.2 The conceivability of possible worlds -- 5.3 Metaphysical zombies -- 5.4 Kim's "supervenience argument" -- 5.5 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 6: E-PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL QUALITIES -- 6.0 Introduction -- 6.1 Vehicles and content - an analogy -- 6.2 Phenomenal content and representational content -- 6.2.1 One vehicle, different contents -- 6.2.2 One content, different vehicles -- 6.2.3 Nonrepresentational phenomenal contents -- 6.3 Phenomenal character and physical states -- 6.3.1 Phenomenal character and biological functions -- 6.3.2 Phenomenal space -- 6.4 The knowledge argument -- 6.4.1 Mary does not acquire new knowledge -- 6.4.2 The ability hypothesis -- 6.4.3 The limits of scientific knowledge -- 6.5 Conclusion -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES.
Summary: Die Reihe präsentiert Monographien und Sammelbände zur österreichischen Philosophie (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong u.a.) sowie zur Phänomenologie und ihrer Geschichte im Allgemeinen. Phenomenology & Mind bietet darüber hinaus ein Publikationsforum für eine große Bandbreite unterschiedlicher Forschungsansätze zur Philosophie des Geistes.
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Intro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1: A PHYSICALIST APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS -- 1.0 Introduction -- 1.1 Consciousness and "what it is like" -- 1.2 Realism about consciousness -- 1.2.1 Eliminativism -- 1.2.2 The problem of consciousness -- 1.3 Physicalism about consciousness -- 1.3.1 Physical items -- 1.3.2 Supervenience -- 1.4 The mind/body duality -- 1.5 Minds and bodies -- 1.5.1 Mind-body causal relations -- 1.5.2 Epiphenomenalism -- 1.5.3 Monism -- 1.6 Panpsychism -- 1.6.1 The combination problem -- 1.6.2 Panpsychism and neuroscience -- 1.7 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 2: STRONG AI AND COMPUTATIONALISM -- 2.0 Introduction -- 2.1 Strong AI -- 2.1.1 Conscious behaviour -- 2.1.2 Consciousness and behaviour -- 2.2 Computational functionalism -- 2.2.1 Functionalism and consciousness -- 2.2.2 Functions and information -- 2.3 The internal character of consciousness -- 2.4 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 3: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS -- 3.0 Introduction -- 3.1 Higher-order representation theories of consciousness -- 3.2 The unity of consciousness -- 3.3 The explanatory gap -- 3.3.1 Subjectivity and reality -- 3.3.2 Intersubjective accessibility -- 3.4 The homunculus fallacy -- 3.5 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 4: SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY -- 4.0 Introduction -- 4.1 Supervenience and ontology -- 4.2 Consciousness and supervenience -- 4.3 Microphysicalism -- 4.4 The levels of reality -- 4.5 Emergence -- 4.6 The case for emergence -- 4.6.1 The kinetic theory of gases -- 4.6.2 The EPR Paradox and Bell's theorem -- 4.6.3 Microphysicalism and nonlocality -- 4.7 Emergence laws -- 4.8 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 5: E-PHYSICALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS -- 5.0 Introduction -- 5.1 Experiencers -- 5.2 The possible worlds strategy -- 5.2.1 Physical and metaphysical possibility.

5.2.2 The conceivability of possible worlds -- 5.3 Metaphysical zombies -- 5.4 Kim's "supervenience argument" -- 5.5 Conclusion -- CHAPTER 6: E-PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL QUALITIES -- 6.0 Introduction -- 6.1 Vehicles and content - an analogy -- 6.2 Phenomenal content and representational content -- 6.2.1 One vehicle, different contents -- 6.2.2 One content, different vehicles -- 6.2.3 Nonrepresentational phenomenal contents -- 6.3 Phenomenal character and physical states -- 6.3.1 Phenomenal character and biological functions -- 6.3.2 Phenomenal space -- 6.4 The knowledge argument -- 6.4.1 Mary does not acquire new knowledge -- 6.4.2 The ability hypothesis -- 6.4.3 The limits of scientific knowledge -- 6.5 Conclusion -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES.

Die Reihe präsentiert Monographien und Sammelbände zur österreichischen Philosophie (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong u.a.) sowie zur Phänomenologie und ihrer Geschichte im Allgemeinen. Phenomenology & Mind bietet darüber hinaus ein Publikationsforum für eine große Bandbreite unterschiedlicher Forschungsansätze zur Philosophie des Geistes.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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