TY  - BOOK
AU  - Levy Yeyati,Eduardo
TI  - Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the "Overlending Syndrome"
T2  - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
SN  - 145185238X :
SN  - 1018-5941
PY  - 1999///
CY  - Washington, D.C.
PB  - International Monetary Fund
KW  - Banking Crises
KW  - imf
KW  - Capital Account Liberalization
KW  - Deposit Insurance
KW  - Deposit Rates
KW  - International Capital Markets
KW  - International Capital
KW  - Argentina
KW  - Brazil
KW  - Chile
KW  - Indonesia
KW  - Mexico
N2  - The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on international capital flows are lifted, banks in low-risk developed countries benefit from lending funds captured in home markets at low deposit rates to high-risk/high-yield projects in emerging economies, even though these projects command lower expected returns. This, in turn, has a negative impact on bank profitability in the borrowing country, even when foreign funds are intermediated through domestic banks. The results are consistent with the surge in international bank lending flows that led to recent banking crises in Asia
UR  - http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/02844-9781451852387/02844-9781451852387/02844-9781451852387.xml
UR  - http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/9781451852387
ER  -