TY  - BOOK
AU  - Annen,Kurt
AU  - Moers,Luc
TI  - Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation
T2  - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
SN  - 147550554X :
SN  - 1018-5941
PY  - 2012///
CY  - Washington, D.C.
PB  - International Monetary Fund
KW  - Aid Coordination
KW  - imf
KW  - Aid Effectiveness
KW  - Aid Fragmentation
KW  - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
KW  - Donor Competition
KW  - Donor Coordination
KW  - Canada
KW  - China, People's Republic of
KW  - France
KW  - Japan
KW  - Korea, Republic of
N2  - This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation
UR  - http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/13039-9781475505542/13039-9781475505542/13039-9781475505542.xml
UR  - http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/9781475505542
ER  -