TY  - BOOK
AU  - Perotti,Enrico Camillo
AU  - Ratnovski,Lev
AU  - Vlahu,Razvan
TI  - Capital Regulation and Tail Risk
T2  - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
SN  - 1462308260 :
SN  - 1018-5941
PY  - 2011///
CY  - Washington, D.C.
PB  - International Monetary Fund
KW  - Banker
KW  - imf
KW  - Banking
KW  - Capital Ratio
KW  - Criteria for Decision-Making Under Risk and Uncertainty
KW  - Financial Innovation
KW  - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
KW  - United States
N2  - The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk asserts. We show that this undermines the traditional result that high capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an unintended effect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in non-tail risky project realizations. The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation
UR  - http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12113-9781462308262/12113-9781462308262/12113-9781462308262.xml
UR  - http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/9781462308262
ER  -