Intro -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- I Special Addresses -- 1 Protecting the Stability of Global Financial Markets Paul A. Volcker -- 2. Global Macroprudential Regulation Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa -- 3. The Challenge of Taking Macroprudential Decisions: Who Will Press Which Button(s)? Jaime Caruana -- The Global Financial Stability Framework: A Summary -- What Have We Learned about the Macroeconomic Impact of Prudential Policy?2 -- How Much Macroprudential Policy Should Be Embedded in the Regulation?4 -- How Many Buttons? -- Who Will Press the Button? -- 4. Macroprudential Regulation and Evolution: Looking at the Financial System Through Darwin's Glasses Charles Taylor -- The Financial System Is an Evolutionary System -- Evolution Is All About Instability -- Implications for Macro-Prudential Strategy -- 4. Conclusions -- II Why Macroprudential Policies Are Needed -- 5 Lessons from American Bank Supervision from the Nineteenth Century to the Great Depression Eugene N. White -- Financial Stability: Key Issues -- The Regulation of the National Banking System, 1864-1913 -- The Supervision of the National Banking System -- Financial Crises and the Unraveling of the National Banking System -- Bank Supervision in the 1920s - The Arrival of the Fed -- The New Deal's Great Regime Shift -- A Golden Age? -- References -- III Coordination with Other Policies -- 6 Cross-Border Coordination of Macroprudential Policies Attila Csajbok and Julia Kiraly -- Introduction -- Why Cross-Border Coordination of Macroprudential Policies Is Needed? -- What Exactly Is to Be Coordinated? -- How to Coordinate (Locally vs. Globally, Based on Rules vs. Discretion)? -- Example for Global Coordination: The Macroprudential Elements of the Basel III Standards -- Example for Local Coordination: The Case of Austria and Hungary -- Conclusion -- References.

7 Macroprudential Policy: Central Banking Reconsidered Jean-Pierre Landau -- The Challenges for Central Banks -- Macroprudential control of leverage -- Macroprudential regulation of liquidity -- References -- 8 Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy: Some Lessons from the Euro Area Domenico Giannone, Michele Lenza, Huw Pill, and Lucrezia Reichlin -- Introduction -- The Nature of the Financial Crisis -- The ECB's Policy Response: (1) Standard Measures -- The ECB's Policy Response: (2) Non-Standard Measures -- Impact on Financial Stability: Immediate and Longer-Term Effects -- Concluding Remarks -- References -- 9 Commentary on Macroprudential and Other Policies E. Philip Davis -- References -- IV Components of Macroprudential Regulation -- 10 Measuring Systemic Risk Viral V. Acharya -- 11 Systemic Risk in Bankruptcy Exceptions, Natural Candidates for Liquidity Charges Enrico Perotti -- The Build-Up in Liquidity Risk -- Containing Liquidity Risk -- Targeting the Losses from Liquidity Runs: Tax the Bankruptcy Exceptions -- The History of the Bankruptcy Privileges -- Evidence from the Crisis and Related Research -- Conclusions -- References -- 12 Working Macroprudential Tools Jesús Saurina -- Introduction -- How do Dynamic Provisions Work? The Theoretical Mechanism -- How Much Was Built Up and How Much Has Been Used? The Mechanism in Motion -- Other Macroprudential Tools to Reduce Procyclicality -- Conclusions -- References -- V Structuring Macroprudential Regulation -- 13 On the Governance of Macroprudential Policies Erlend W. Nier -- Introduction -- Prudential Policies: Objectives, Tasks, Perimeters -- Microprudential and macroprudential policies -- Macroprudential policies - Objective -- Macroprudential policies - Tasks -- Macroprudential policies - Perimeters -- Governance of Macroprudential Policies.

First basic challenge - dynamic system requires powers -- Information collection powers -- Designation powers -- Rulemaking and calibration powers -- Need for a strong mandate -- Second basic challenge - Biases towards inaction -- Need to align mandate and powers -- Harnessing institutional expertise and incentives - The role of central banks -- Separate governance for monetary and macroprudential policy functions -- Crisis management and the role of the treasury -- Independence and accountability -- International cooperation -- Conclusions -- References -- 14 Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of Regulatory Architecture Marco Espinosa-Vega, Juan Solé, Charles Kahn and Rafael Matta -- Introduction -- The Model -- Results -- Regulators with private information -- Extensions and Concluding Remarks -- References -- VI Cross-Border Issues -- 15 The Last Frontier: Protecting Critical Functions Across Borders Eva H. G. Hüpkes -- Introduction -- Save functions, not institutions -- Achievements to date -- The challenge -- How to Achieve an Efficient and Equitable Cross-Border Solution -- Toward a Framework for Cross-Border Resolution -- Streamline structure: "Form must follow function" -- B. The quest for continuity - Market-based mechanisms -- Conclusion -- References -- 16 Cross-Border Crisis Management: Can Harmonization Create Harmony If the Orchestra Is Dissonant? Grégory Nguyen and Peter Praet -- Introduction -- Cross-Border Crisis Management: The European Experience -- The Rules of the Game -- A stylized sequence for crisis management -- Common objectives for crisis management -- Co-operation structure and the balancing act -- Improving Crisis Management: The Holistic Approach of the European Union -- Improving the pre-crisis stage -- Improving the crisis stage -- Improving the post-crisis stage -- Concluding Remarks -- References.

17 Regulation and Competition in EU Banking: Before, During, and After the Crisis André Sapir -- Introduction -- Before the Crisis -- Mismatch between market and regulatory integration4 -- No mismatch between market and competition policy integration -- During the Crisis -- Large amounts of state aid to the EU banking sector -- Large state aid control activity -- The ECB to the rescue -- After the Crisis -- Conclusion -- References -- VII Market Discipline -- 18 Cycle-Proof Market Discipline and Macroprudential Regulation Luc Laeven -- The Need for Macroprudential Regulation -- Complacent Regulators and the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem -- Market Discipline of Banks -- Going Forward -- References -- 19 Curbing Risk on Wall Street Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales -- Averting Future Bailouts -- Regulating Risk -- A Market-Based Trigger -- The Concept in Practice -- Beyond Too-Big-to-Fail -- 20 What Role, If Any, Can Market Discipline Play in Supporting Macroprudential Policy? María J. Nieto -- Introduction -- Effectiveness of Market Discipline in Its Supporting Role of Macroprudential Policy: Preconditions for Effective Market Discipline -- Adequate and timely information on financial institutions' risk profiles -- Financial institutions' creditors must consider themselves at risk and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable -- Balance Sheet and Market Indicators in Macroprudential Policy: The Relevance of Market Discipline -- Market prices and balance sheet indicators as measuring tools of systemic importance -- Market prices and balance sheet indicators of financial instability -- Policy Conclusions -- References -- Annex 1: List of EU banks with CDS quoted in the market (September 2010 Source: Dealogic) -- VIII Policy Panel: Where to from Here? -- 21 Macroprudential Regulatory Policies: The New Road to Financial Stability William R. White.

The Pursuit of Financial Stability in the Past -- Is Financial Stability "Enough" to Guarantee Macroeconomic Stability? -- Two Important Practical Implications -- Impediments to the Introduction of a Macrofinancial Stability Regime -- (1) The acceptance problem -- (2) The identification problem -- The will to act problem -- Conclusions -- References -- 22 Beyond Regulatory Challenge: The New Public Policy Paradigm Tarisa Wataganase -- 23 Challenges for Macroprudential Supervision Randall Kroszner -- References -- 24 Macroprudential Regulation, Financial Stability, and Capital Flows José De Gregorio -- Some Evidence and Factors behind the Resumption of Inflows -- Dealing with Capital Inflows -- Capital Inflows and Financial Stability -- "Basel III" and the Chilean Banking System -- Concluding Remarks -- References -- Agenda -- THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23 -- FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24 -- Index.

Key Features:Very impressive list of speakers, particularly the keynote speakersThe global perspective provided by leading regulators and academicsThe 'currentness' or highly topical nature of the issues addressed.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.