Cover -- Theory of Conditional Games -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Preface -- Motivation -- The intended readership -- Structure of the book -- The usage of personal pronouns -- Acknowledgments -- 1: Sociality -- 1.1 Classical theory -- 1.2 Sociality models -- 1.2.1 Minimal sociality -- 1.2.2 Rationality -- 1.2.3 Influence -- 1.3 Coordination -- 1.4 Uncertainty -- 1.5 Satisficing -- 1.6 Applications -- 1.6.1 Classical game theory -- 1.6.2 Classical social choice theory -- 1.6.3 Artificially intelligent societies -- 1.7 Summary -- 2: Conditioning -- 2.1 Complex social models -- 2.1.1 Conjectures -- 2.1.2 Concordance -- 2.2 Aggregation -- 2.2.1 Ordinal aggregation -- 2.2.2 Cardinal aggregation -- 2.2.3 Synthesis -- 2.2.4 The aggregation theorem -- 2.3 Coherence -- 2.4 Utility networks -- 2.5 Reframing -- 2.6 Summary -- 3: Solutions -- 3.1 Conditioned Nash equilibria -- 3.2 Concurrent decisions -- 3.3 Marginalization -- 3.4 Group and individual welfare -- 3.5 Negotiation -- 3.6 Illustrative example -- 3.6.1 Conditioned Nash equilibria -- 3.6.2 Concurrence -- 3.6.3 Marginalization -- 3.6.4 Group and individual welfare solutions -- 3.7 Sociation -- 3.8 Nondominance -- 3.9 Conditional social choice -- 3.10 Summary -- 4: Coordination -- 4.1 Extrinsic versus intrinsic coordination -- 4.2 Hardness -- 4.3 Hardness for single agents -- 4.3.1 Subordination -- 4.3.2 Ambivalence -- 4.3.3 Hardness -- 4.4 Mutual information and coordination -- 4.4.1 Joint Hardness -- 4.4.2 Conditional hardness -- 4.4.3 Relative hardness and mutual information -- 4.4.4 Coordination capacity for two stakeholders -- 4.4.5 Coordination capacity for n>2 stakeholders -- 4.5 Summary -- 5: Uncertainty -- 5.1 Unification -- 5.2 Summary -- 6: Satisficing -- 6.1 Error avoidance -- 6.1.1 Theoretical background -- 6.1.2 Extension to the multivariate case.

6.2 Failure avoidance -- 6.2.1 Multiple selves -- 6.2.2 Single-stakeholder satisficing -- 6.2.3 Multiple stakeholder satisficing -- 6.3 Satisficing games -- 6.4 Satisficing coherence -- 6.5 Satisficing compromises -- 6.6 Satisficing social choice -- 6.7 Coordination -- 6.7.1 Interself coordination -- 6.7.2 Intraself coordination -- 6.7.3 Interagent coordination -- 6.7.4 Intragroup coordination -- 6.8 Summary -- 7: Applications -- 7.1 Battle of the Sexes -- 7.2 The Ultimatum game -- 7.2.1 Individually satisficing solutions -- 7.2.2 Jointly satisficing solutions -- 7.2.3 Reconciling joint and individual choices -- 7.3 The Stag Hunt game -- 7.4 The family walk -- 7.5 Unmanned aerial vehicle control -- 7.5.1 Simulation model -- 7.5.2 Optimal solution -- 7.5.3 Satisficing solutions -- 7.5.4 Global satisficing structure -- 7.5.5 Markov satisficing structure -- 7.5.6 Simulation results -- 8: Conclusion -- 8.1 Learning -- 8.2 Model identification -- 8.3 Dynamic systems -- 8.4 Final thoughts -- Appendix A: Probability -- A.1 The uses of probability theory -- A.2 Probability distribution theory -- A.2.1 Foundational elements -- A.2.2 Distributions for collections of random variables -- A.2.3 Distributions for collections of random vectors -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index.

This book describes conditional games - a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.