Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 War-Stopping Techniques in the Falklands (Christina Parajon) -- I. Introduction -- II. History of the Conflict -- III. The War -- IV. War-Stopping Techniques -- A. U.S. Shuttle Diplomacy -- 1. London Round One -- 2. Buenos Aires Round One -- 3. London Round Two -- 4. Buenos Aires Round Two -- B. The Peruvian Mediation -- C. The Secretary-General's Good Offices -- V. Appraisal of War-Stopping Measures -- A. Disputants' Domestic Constraints -- B. The Haig Mediation: Problems of Timing, Credibility, Process, and Mixed Messages -- 1. Timing: Overcoming Optimism Bias -- 2. Credibility and Authority -- 3. Process: The Shuttling War-Stopper -- 4. Mixing Messages -- C. Belaunde's Mediation: Problems of Interest and Process -- 1. Interests of the Mediator -- 2. Process: Detachment -- D. UN Involvement -- 1. Timing: The Inflection Point -- 2. Credibility: The Taint of Past Failures -- 3. Credibility: The Secretary-General with Only His Good Offices -- 4. Process: Mixing Enforcement and Mediation -- VI. Conclusion and Lessons Learned -- Chapter 2 Nagorno Karabakh: A War without Peace (Nicholas W. Miller) -- I. Introduction -- II. Background -- III. The History of Nagorno Karabakh -- A. The Russian Empire -- B. World War I and Caucasian Independence -- IV. A Century of Conflict -- A. The Soviet Period -- B. The Road to War -- C. Collapse of Soviet Power and the Period of Open Warfare -- V. Failed War-Stopping (1991-1994) -- A. Yeltsin-Nazarbayev Mediation (1991) -- B. Turkish and Iranian Mediation Efforts (1992) -- C. CSCE/OSCE Mediation Efforts Begin (1992) -- D. Competition between Russia and the CSCE (1992-1994) -- E. 1993 CSCE/OSCE Peace Plan -- F. Renewed Russian Mediation (Summer 1993) -- VI. War-Stopping without Peace (1994-2008).

A. Competitive Russian and CSCE Mediation Efforts (1994) -- B. Cooperation between CSCE/OSCE and Russia (1994-1996) -- C. France, Russia, and the United States Take Over Mediation (1997-Present) -- D. A Decade without Progress (1998-2008) -- VII. Analysis and Conclusions -- Chapter 3 War and Peace in Rwanda (Tom Dannenbaum) -- I. Introduction -- II. A Brief History of Rwanda Prior to the Conflict -- A. Rwanda under Colonial Rule -- B. Tutsi Exodus and the Rise of a New Leadership in Exile -- C. Postcolonial Rwanda (III. The War between the RPF and the Government of) -- III. The War between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda, 1990-1993 -- A. Early Skirmishes -- B. Early Efforts to Stop the War -- C. The Inefficacy of the Regional Efforts at War-Stopping -- D. Explaining the Failure of the Regional War-Stopping Efforts in 1991 -- E. Democratization, Political Fragmentation, and Radicalization in Kigali -- F. The Internationally Mediated Arusha Peace Process -- IV. Stalling, Nonimplementation, and Genocide -- A. Stalling and Nonimplementation -- B. The Assassination of Habyarimana, Genocide, and the Withdrawal of Peacekeepers -- C. RPF Victory and the Displacement of the War -- V. Why Did Arusha Fail and What Could Have Been Done Differently? -- VI. Conclusion-Lessons for Peacemakers and War-Stoppers -- Chapter 4 War-Stopping and Peacemaking during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) (Colby E. Barrett) -- I. Introduction -- II. Early History and Geography of the Malayan Peninsula (30,000 B.C.-1924) -- A. Geography and Settlement -- B. European Occupation -- III. The Foundations of Communism and World War II (1925-1947) -- A. The Rise of the MCP -- B. British Defeat -- C. Japanese Occupation -- D. Malayan Resistance and Lai Tek -- E. The Postwar Era -- IV. Early British Failures and Innovations (1948-1951) -- A. The World Setting.

B. MCP Strategy and Tactics -- C. British Strategy and Operations -- D. British Tactics -- E. The Briggs Plan -- V. Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Victory (1952-1957) -- A. The Arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer -- B. Politics -- C. Military Doctrine and Operations -- D. Police, Intelligence, and Information Services -- E. Negotiations and Independence -- VI. Aftermath and Evaluation (1958-1963) -- VII. Conclusion -- Chapter 5 Separatist Insurgency in Southern Thailand: An Approach to Peacemaking (Jonathan Ross-Harrington) -- I. Introduction -- II. Conflict History -- A. From Annexation to Organized Insurgency (1906-1959) -- B. The Height of Organized Resistance (1959-1981) -- C. A New Approach: Government Intervention, Simmering Tensions, and Insurgent Fragmentation (1981-2001) -- D. Enter Thaksin: A Breakdown of Relative Stability (2001-2004) -- III. Current Phase: 2004-Present -- A. Critical Events -- B. Key Trends -- C. Insurgent Groups and Violent Actors -- 1. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRNC) -- 2. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) -- 3. Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and New-PULO -- 4. Paramilitaries and Militias -- 5. Foreign Elements -- D. Ideology, Objectives, and Strategy of the Insurgents -- IV. A Framework for Understanding Violence and Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand -- A. Conflict Drivers: Identity, Behavior, and Structure -- 1. Identity -- 2. Behavior -- 3. Structure -- B. The Evolving Role of Religion as an Independent Conflict Driver -- C. The Dynamic Interaction of Conflict Drivers -- V. Past Approaches to War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Southern Thailand -- A. The General Phibun Model -- B. The General Prem Model -- C. The Thaksin Model -- VI. Peacemaking Strategies in Southern Thailand -- A. Challenges to a Lasting Peace.

B. Elements of a Comprehensive Peacemaking Strategy in Southern Thailand -- 1. Draining the Bathwater: Addressing Long-Standing Grievances of the General Population -- 2. A New Approach to Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations -- 3. Relieving Intercommunal Tensions: Locating Middle-Range and Grassroots Agents of Peace -- 4. Malaysian Cooperation -- VII. Conclusion -- Chapter 6 War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Mozambique (Caroline A. Gross) -- I. Introduction -- II. Colonial History and Independence, 1498-1975 -- A. Portuguese Presence -- B. The Struggle for Independence -- III. Mozambican Civil War, 1976-1992 -- A. Causes and Parties -- 1. Frelimo -- 2. Renamo -- B. Cold War Effects -- C. War Operations -- 1. Renamo Tactics and Goals -- 2. Frelimo's Response: Too Little, Too Late -- IV. Negotiating an End to War, 1988-1992 -- A. Failed Negotiations -- 1. Nkomati Accord -- 2. Pretoria Declaration -- B. The Road to Rome -- C. Rome -- V. From War-Stopping to Peacemaking, 1992 Onward -- A. ONUMOZ -- B. Postelection Period -- C. Factors that Helped Maintain the Peace -- 1. Lack of Precious Resources -- 2. Demobilization First, Elections Second -- 3. Incentives for Renamo to Stay Out of the Bush -- 4. Remarkable Economic Development and Optimism -- 5. Lack of an Ethnic Element to the Conflict -- 6. Support-and Exhaustion-of the Population -- VI. Conclusion -- Index.

During most of human history, war was a basic instrument of statecraft, considered, for the most part, a lawful, honorable, ennobling, and even romantic pursuit. By contrast, peacemaking remained a marginal and indeed incongruous interstate activity. A war would end when the belligerents ended it. The experience of the twentieth centurya (TM)s two world wars has changed, at least, the official view. The introduction of ever more destructive weapons, the drastic escalation of civilian deaths, and the economic and environmental devastation that modern war brought combined to forge an international legal impulse to stop, if not prevent, wars, resolve ongoing conflicts, and build peace. Yet stopping a war, though a useful, if not indispensable, step toward making peace, does not lead ineluctably to peace. Nor does the international communitya (TM)s interposition of a oepeacekeepersa; their title notwithstanding, peacekeepers only try to keep a stopped war stopped. Making peace is a separate operation, often applying some parts of the same armamentarium but in very different ways. International efforts at stopping wars and making peace, in the era in which such initiatives have become lawful and virtuous, have proved remarkably unsuccessful. Yet the proliferation of ever more destructive weapons, the growing sense of insecurity and expectation of violence, the increasing difficulty of containing wars within a single arena, the threat of breakdown of order, with the prospect of epidemics and mass migration, all work to intensify the demand to stop wars and to make peace. This volume explores these issues by analyzing the theoretical literature on stopping wars and making peace and its application to a number of concrete cases, including the Falklands, Nagorno Karabakh, Rwanda, Malaya, Thailand, and Mozambique. Each case examines one conflict and the

efforts undertaken to stop it and transform it into a peace system. The case studies draw general lessons from the incidents studied, extracting guidelines and principles that might serve those called upon to stop wars and make peace and offering a number of instructive points.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.