Intro -- Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe -- Contents -- Preface -- INTRODUCTION -- Economic Conditions and Electoral Behavior in Transnational Perspective -- CHAPTER 1 Public Attitudes Toward Economic Conditions and Their Impact on Government Behavior -- CHAPTER 2 Party Strategies, World Demand and Unemployment in Britain and the United States, 1947-1983 -- CHAPTER 3 Perceptions of Economic Performance and Voting Behavior in the 1983 General Election in Britain -- CHAPTER 4 Political Change and Stability of the Popularity Function: The French General Election of 1981 -- CHAPTER 5 Economic Concerns in Italian Electoral Behavior: Toward a Rational Electorate? -- CHAPTER 6 Economics, Democracy, and Spanish Elections -- CHAPTER 7 Economic Effects on the Vote in Norway -- CHAPTER 8 Economic Self-Interest and the Vote: Evidence and Meaning -- CHAPTER 9 Economics, Politics, and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity -- The Voter as Juror: Attributing Responsibility for Economic Conditions -- CHAPTER 11 A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting -- CHAPTER 12 Economic Determinants and Electoral Outcomes: Some Personal Observations -- Author Index.

Does economics influence elections? How does such influence work? Under what conditions is it more or less likely to occur? These appear to be simple questions, but answering them is difficult. And they may appear to be trivial questions to those who contend that elections in the western democracies are at best placebos that disguise the Â"realÂ" dynamics of power in societies still mostly characterized by the capitalist mode of production, even if the economy is directed by government. This is an argument we do not propose to address. We do believe that free, popular elections matter, and that they make a difference precisely because, at periodic intervals, they set the limits or constraints within which capitalist as well as anticapitalist elites pursue their economic and political goals. To oppose the voice of the people to the peopleÂ's manipulation by elites, it seems to us, creates an unnecessary dualism. This dualism is not useful because it cannot come to grips with the question of how and why popular electorates respond as they do to more or less elite-managed economies, and how and why elites in turn Â"take account ofÂ" or are Â"responsive toÂ" whatever messages they may receive from the electorate.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.