Intro -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1-1 What Is Decision Theory? -- 1-2 The Basic Framework -- 1-2a Some Philosophical Problems about Problem Specifications -- 1-3 Certainty, Ignorance, and Risk -- 1-3a Some Details of Formulation -- 1-4 Decision Trees -- 1-5 References -- Chapter 2 Decisions under Ignorance -- 2-1 Preference Orderings -- 2-2 The Maximin Rule -- 2-3 The Minimax Regret Rule -- 2-4 The Optimism-Pessimism Rule -- 2-5 The Principle of Insufficient Reason -- 2-6 Too Many Rules? -- 2-7 An Application in Social Philosophy: Rawls vs. Harsanyi -- 2-8 References -- Chapter 3 Decisions under Risk: Probability -- 3-1 Maximizing Expected Values -- 3-2 Probability Theory -- 3-2a Bayes's Theorem without Priors -- 3-2b Bayes's Theorem and the Value of Additional Information -- 3-2c Statistical Decision Theory and Decisions under Ignorance -- 3-3 Interpretations of Probability -- 3-3a The Classical View -- 3-3b The Relative Frequency View -- 3-3c Subjective Views -- 3-3d Coherence and Conditionalization -- 3-4 References -- Chapter 4 Decisions under Risk: Utility -- 4-1 Interval Utility Scales -- 4-2 Monetary Values vs. Utilities -- 4-3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory -- 4-3a Some Comments and Qualifications on the Expected Utility Theorem -- 4-4 Criticisms of Utility Theory -- 4-4a Allais's Paradox -- 4-4b Ellsberg's Paradox -- 4-4c The St. Petersburg Paradox -- 4-5 The Predictor Paradox -- 4-6 Causal Decision Theory -- 4-6a Objections and Alternatives -- 4-6b Concluding Remarks on the Paradoxes -- 4-7 References -- Chapter 5 Game Theory -- 5-1 The Basic Concepts of Game Theory -- 5-2 Two-Person Strictly Competitive Games -- 5-3 Equilibrium Strategy Pairs -- 5-3a Mixed Strategies -- 5-3b Proof of the Maximin Theorem for Two-by-Two Games -- 5-3c A Shortcut -- 5-3d On Taking Chances.

5-4 Two-Person Nonzero Sum Games: Failures of the Equilibrium Concept -- 5-4a The Clash of Wills -- 5-4b The Prisoner's Dilemma -- 5-4c Other Prisoner's Dilemmas -- 5-4d The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Predictor -- 5-4e Morals for Rationality and Morality -- 5-5 Cooperative Games -- 5-5a Bargaining Games -- 5-6 Games with Three or More Players -- 5-7 References -- Chapter 6 Social Choices -- 6-1 The Problem of Social Choice -- 6-2 Arrow's Theorem -- 6-2a Arrow's Conditions -- 6-2b Arrow's Theorem and Its Proof -- 6-3 Majority Rule -- 6-4 Utilitarianism -- 6-4a Harsanyi's Theorem -- 6-4b Critique of Harsanyi's Theorem -- 6-4c Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility -- 6-5 References -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V.

Provides a broad yet rigorous introduction to the fundamentals of decision theory (the collection of mathematical, logical, and philosophical theories of decision making by rational individuals) that pays particular attention to matters of philosophical and logical interest.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.