Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions : Models of Political Rationality.

By: Drury, A. CooperMaterial type: TextTextSeries: Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis SerPublisher: New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005Copyright date: ©2005Description: 1 online resource (236 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781403976956Subject(s): Economic sanctions, American | Presidents -- United States -- Decision making | United States -- Foreign relationsGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions : Models of Political RationalityDDC classification: 327.73/009/0511 LOC classification: JZ2-6530HF1351-1647JOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Cover -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice -- 3 Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness -- 4 Why Does the President Sanction? Beyond the Conventional Wisdom -- 5 When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis -- 6 Is There a Target Selection Bias? -- 7 The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy -- 8 What Kinds of Sanctions Does the President Use? Domestic Constraints and Incentives -- 9 Conclusions and Implications -- Appendix -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.
Summary: Economic sanctions: panacea, symbolic but ineffectual, or useless and counterproductive? While these questions have framed much the existing debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.
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Cover -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice -- 3 Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness -- 4 Why Does the President Sanction? Beyond the Conventional Wisdom -- 5 When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis -- 6 Is There a Target Selection Bias? -- 7 The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy -- 8 What Kinds of Sanctions Does the President Use? Domestic Constraints and Incentives -- 9 Conclusions and Implications -- Appendix -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

Economic sanctions: panacea, symbolic but ineffectual, or useless and counterproductive? While these questions have framed much the existing debate, Drury digs deeper to why foreign policy leaders, and especially the president, choose sanctions, of which type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. Skilfully integrating domestic and international factors, and placing the analysis of sanctions directly into the mainstream of strategic studies and decision theory, this book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of databases.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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