Intro -- Contents -- I: Introduction to stit -- 1 Stit: A canonical form for agentives -- 1A Agentives -- 1B Stit: Simple cases -- 1C Grammar of the modal logic of agency -- 1D Mini-history of the modal logic of agency -- 1E Conclusion and summary -- 2 Stit: Introductory theory, semantics, and applications -- 2A Theory and semantics: The two stits -- 2B Applications of stit, with many pictures -- 3 Small yet important differences from earlier proposals -- 3A Von Wright -- 3B Chisholm -- 3C Kenny -- 3D Castañeda -- 3E Davidson -- 3F Conclusion -- 4 Stit and the imperative -- 4A The theory of fiats -- 4B Ross's paradox and stit -- 4C Chellas's theory -- 4D Agentive constructions -- 4E Negations of imperatives -- 4F The many varieties of imperatives -- 4G Embedding imperatives -- 4H Conclusion -- 5 Promising: Stits, claims, and strategies -- 5A From stit to promising -- 5B From RR to promising -- 5C Strategic content of promises and word-givings -- II: Foundations of indeterminism -- 6 Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line -- 6A Preliminary considerations -- 6B Parameters of truth -- 6C The assertion problem -- 6D The Thin Red Line -- 6E Time's wingèd chariot hurries near -- 7 Agents and choices in branching time with instants -- 7A Theory of branching time -- 7B Theoretical reflections on indeterminism -- 7C Theory of agents and choices -- 7D Domain -- 8 Indexical semantics under indeterminism -- 8A Sources -- 8B Structure parameters: The "world" of the speakers -- 8C Interpretation and model: The "language" of the speakers -- 8D Points of evaluation, and policies -- 8E Generic semantic ideas -- 8F Semantics for stit-free locutions -- 8G Clauses for stit functors -- III: Applications of the achievement stit -- 9 Could have done otherwise -- 9A Could have been and might have been -- 9B Could have done and might have done.

9C Might have been otherwise -- 9D Might not have done it -- 9E Could not have avoided doing -- 9F Could have prevented -- 9G Could have refrained -- 9H Might have refrained -- 9I Had available a strategy for not doing -- 9J Summary -- 10 Multiple and joint agency -- 10A Preliminary facts -- 10B Other-agent nested stits -- 10C Joint agency: Plain and strict -- 10D Other-agent nested joint stits -- IV: Applications of the deliberative stit -- 11 Conditional obligation, deontic paradoxes, and stit -- 11A Technical preliminaries -- 11B Semantics of obligation -- 11C Completeness -- 11D Conditional obligation -- 11E O⊃-statements versus ⊃O-statements -- 11F The Good Samaritan -- 11G Contrary-to-duty obligations -- 11H Problems with the proposed semantics of obligation -- 12 Marcus and the problem of nested deontic modalities -- 12A The parking problem -- 12B The form of obligations -- 12C The Anderson/dstit simplification -- 12D The form of prohibitions -- 12E Generalized prohibitions -- 12F Generalization on agents -- 12G Temporal generalization -- 12H The outer ought -- V: Strategies -- 13 An austere theory of strategies -- 13A Nature of austere strategics -- 13B Review of choices in branching histories -- 13C Elementary theory of strategies -- 13D Favoring -- 13E Application to finding a strategy for inaction -- 14 Deontic kinematics and austere strategics -- 14A Basic concepts -- 14B From Thomason's deontic kinematics to austere strategics -- 14C From austere strategics to Thomason's deontic kinematics -- 14D Remarks -- VI: Proofs and models -- 15 Decidability of one-agent achievement-stit theory with refref -- 15A Preliminaries -- 15B Companions -- 15C Soundness: Validity of refref equivalence -- 15D Companion sets -- 15E Alternatives and counters -- 15F Semi-ref-counters -- 15G Completeness and finite model property.

16 On the basic one-agent achievement-stit theory -- 16A Preliminaries -- 16B Soundness -- 16C Companion sets and their alternatives -- 16D Construction of preliminary structures -- 16E Completeness -- 17 Decidability of many-agent deliberative-stit theories -- 17A Preliminaries -- 17B Soundness -- 17C Completeness and compactness -- 17D Finite model property -- 18 Doing and refraining from refraining -- 18A Preliminaries -- 18B Main results -- Appendix: Lists for reference -- 1 Stit theses: Thesis 1-Thesis 6 -- 2 Structures -- 3 BT + I + AC postulates: Post. 1-Post. 10 -- 4 Branching-time-with-instants definitions: Def. 1-Def. 9 -- 5 Agent-choice definitions: Def. 10-Def. 14 -- 6 Basic semantic definitions: Def. 15-Def. 16 -- 7 Derivative semantic definitions: Def. 17-Def. 20 -- 8 Grammar -- 9 Axiomatics concepts: Ax. Conc. 1, Ax. Conc. 2, and Ax. Conc. 3 -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Z.

Here is an important new theory of human action, a theory that assumes actions are founded on choices made by agents who face an open future. It is a theory that makes indeterminism not only intelligible but illuminating. Tools from philosophy of language and philosophical logic help generate a full-scale account of agents "seeing to it that." The authors then proceed to clarify a variety of action-related topics such as determinism vs. indeterminism, imperatives, promises, strategies, joint agency, "could have done otherwise," deontic constructions, and assertions about a not yet settled future.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.