Deposit Insurance Database [electronic resource] / Asli Demirguc-Kunt

By: Demirguc-Kunt, AsliContributor(s): Demirguc-Kunt, Asli | Kane, Edward | Laeven, LucMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2014Description: 1 online resource (45 p.)Subject(s): Access to Finance | Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | Banks and Banking Reform | Debt Markets | Deposit Insurance | Finance and Financial Sector Development | Financial Crisis | Financial InstitutionsAdditional physical formats: Demirguc-Kunt, Asli: Deposit Insurance Database.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
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This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. The authors extend their earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. They also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.

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