Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System [electronic resource] / Wang, Hua

By: Wang, HuaContributor(s): Wang, Hua | Wheeler, DavidMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1999Description: 1 online resource (32 p.)Subject(s): Abatement | Air Pollution | Economic Development | Economists | Emissions | Environment | Environmental | Environmental Economics and Policies | Environmental Performance | Environmental Protection | Environmental Quality | Green Issues | Income | Industry | Labor | Labor Force | Pollution | Pollution Charges | Poverty | Production | Public Sector Development | Standards | Sulfur Dioxide | Water | Water and Industry | Water Pollution | Water ResourcesAdditional physical formats: Wang, Hua.: Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: May 2000 - How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest - and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems. Wang and Wheeler investigate two aspects of China's pollution levy system, which was first implemented about 20 years ago. First, they analyze what determines differences in enforcement of the pollution levy in various urban areas. They find that collection of the otherwise uniform pollution levy is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality. Air and water pollution levies are higher in areas that are heavily polluted. Second, they analyze the impact of pollution charges on industry's environmental performance, in terms of the pollution intensity of process production and the degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both water pollution and air pollution. Econometric analysis shows that plants respond strongly to the levy by either abating air pollution in the production process or providing end-of-pipe treatment for water pollution. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org.
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May 2000 - How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest - and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems. Wang and Wheeler investigate two aspects of China's pollution levy system, which was first implemented about 20 years ago. First, they analyze what determines differences in enforcement of the pollution levy in various urban areas. They find that collection of the otherwise uniform pollution levy is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality. Air and water pollution levies are higher in areas that are heavily polluted. Second, they analyze the impact of pollution charges on industry's environmental performance, in terms of the pollution intensity of process production and the degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both water pollution and air pollution. Econometric analysis shows that plants respond strongly to the levy by either abating air pollution in the production process or providing end-of-pipe treatment for water pollution. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org.

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