Income Inequality and Redistributive Government Spending [electronic resource]
Material type: TextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 03/14Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003Description: 1 online resource (25 p.)ISBN: 1451843143 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Capital Deepening | Dependent Variable | Gini Coefficient | Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance | Macroeconomic Policy | National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs | Bahamas, The | Bulgaria | El Salvador | Iran, Islamic Republic of | Sri LankaAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Income Inequality and Redistributive Government SpendingOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: The paper examines empirically the question of whether more unequal societies spend more on income redistribution than their more egalitarian counterparts. Theoretical arguments on this issue are inconclusive. The political economy literature suggests that redistributive spending is higher in unequal societies due to median voter preferences. Alternatively, it can be argued that unequal societies may spend less on redistribution because of capital market imperfections. Based on different data sources, the cross-country evidence reported in this paper suggests that more unequal societies do spend less on redistribution.The paper examines empirically the question of whether more unequal societies spend more on income redistribution than their more egalitarian counterparts. Theoretical arguments on this issue are inconclusive. The political economy literature suggests that redistributive spending is higher in unequal societies due to median voter preferences. Alternatively, it can be argued that unequal societies may spend less on redistribution because of capital market imperfections. Based on different data sources, the cross-country evidence reported in this paper suggests that more unequal societies do spend less on redistribution.
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