Privatization and Restructuring [electronic resource] : An Incomplete-Contract Approach / Dieter Bös.
Material type: TextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 96/101Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1996Description: 1 online resource (20 p.)ISBN: 1451852487 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Case of Privatization | Privatization Agency | Privatization in Transition Economies | Privatization Procedure | Privatization | Germany | United KingdomAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Privatization and Restructuring : An Incomplete-Contract ApproachOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: Since an enterprise, which is to be privatized, has to be restructured in uncertainty, and the restructuring investments are sunk when the final decision on the sale price is taken, there is an imminent danger that restructuring is not efficient, and there is underinvestment. We consider, restructuring by the private buyer of the firm, by a government privatization agency, and by both. In the first two cases-one-sided restructuring-a first best can be achieved. In the case of both-sided restructuring, however, the first best cannot be reached if both parties engage in restructuring after signing the contract.Since an enterprise, which is to be privatized, has to be restructured in uncertainty, and the restructuring investments are sunk when the final decision on the sale price is taken, there is an imminent danger that restructuring is not efficient, and there is underinvestment. We consider, restructuring by the private buyer of the firm, by a government privatization agency, and by both. In the first two cases-one-sided restructuring-a first best can be achieved. In the case of both-sided restructuring, however, the first best cannot be reached if both parties engage in restructuring after signing the contract.
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