Barriers to Household Risk Management [electronic resource] : Evidence from India / Robert M Townsend.

By: Townsend, Robert MContributor(s): Cole, Shawn | Gine, Xavier | Tobacman, Jeremy | Topalova, Petia | Townsend, Robert M | Vickery, James IanMaterial type: TextTextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 12/195Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012Description: 1 online resource (43 p.)ISBN: 1475505442 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Basis Risk | Field Experiments | Financial Institutions and Services: General | Household Finance | Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation | Insurance Contracts | IndiaAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Barriers to Household Risk Management : Evidence from IndiaOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.
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Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.

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