Institutional Arrangements for Macroprudential Policy in Asia [electronic resource] / Cheng Hoon Lim.

By: Lim, Cheng HoonContributor(s): Ramchand, Rishi S | Wagner, Helen | Wu, XiaoyongMaterial type: TextTextSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 13/165Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013Description: 1 online resource (22 p.)ISBN: 1484338367 :ISSN: 1018-5941Subject(s): Deposit Insurance | Financial Services | Financial System | Government Policy and Regulation | Institutional Arrangements | Macroprudential | Australia | Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China | Japan | Korea, Republic of | MalaysiaAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Institutional Arrangements for Macroprudential Policy in AsiaOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: This paper surveys institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy in Asia. Central banks in Asia typically have a financial stability mandate, and play a key role in the macroprudential framework. Smaller and more open economies with prudential regulation inside the central bank tend to have institutional arrangements that give the central bank a leading role. In larger and more complex economies where prudential regulation is outside the central bank, the financial stability mandate is usually shared with other agencies and the government tends to play a leading role. Domestic policy coordination is typically performed by a financial stability committee/other coordination body while cross-border cooperation is largely governed by Memoranda of Understanding.
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This paper surveys institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy in Asia. Central banks in Asia typically have a financial stability mandate, and play a key role in the macroprudential framework. Smaller and more open economies with prudential regulation inside the central bank tend to have institutional arrangements that give the central bank a leading role. In larger and more complex economies where prudential regulation is outside the central bank, the financial stability mandate is usually shared with other agencies and the government tends to play a leading role. Domestic policy coordination is typically performed by a financial stability committee/other coordination body while cross-border cooperation is largely governed by Memoranda of Understanding.

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