The highway concession system in Italy [electronic resource] : History, regulation and politics / Nicola Limodio
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TextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2011Description: 1 online resource (17 p.)Subject(s): Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | Debt Markets | Host Country | Infrastructure Economics | Output | Political Economy | Private Entities | Private Sector Development | Roads & Highways | Rule of Law | Transport Economics Policy & PlanningAdditional physical formats: Limodio, Nicola.: The highway concession system in Italy.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: This paper contains a critical discussion of the opening of the highway concession to the private sector in Italy over the past 20 years. It describes the political context, legal mechanisms and regulatory settings; offers an analysis of the changes in the equity composition of concessionaires after the introduction of public-private partnerships, quality standards, and tariff dynamics; and provides some examples. The Italian experience reflects the typical problems of the "build-now-regulate-later" approach recognized in the highway public-private partnership literature. The Italian model is also characterized by the existence of an overly complex regulatory framework, as well as the lack of a single agent in charge of contract enforcement and independent data collection.
This paper contains a critical discussion of the opening of the highway concession to the private sector in Italy over the past 20 years. It describes the political context, legal mechanisms and regulatory settings; offers an analysis of the changes in the equity composition of concessionaires after the introduction of public-private partnerships, quality standards, and tariff dynamics; and provides some examples. The Italian experience reflects the typical problems of the "build-now-regulate-later" approach recognized in the highway public-private partnership literature. The Italian model is also characterized by the existence of an overly complex regulatory framework, as well as the lack of a single agent in charge of contract enforcement and independent data collection.
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