Barriers to household risk management [electronic resource] : Evidence from India / Shawn Cole

By: Cole, ShawnContributor(s): Cole, Shawn | Gine, Xavier | Tobacman, Jeremy | Topalova, Petia | Townsend, Robert | Vickery, JamesMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2010Description: 1 online resource (40 p.)Subject(s): Access to Finance | Consumer Finance | Debt Markets | Economic Development | Emerging Markets | Financial Literacy | Insurance | Labor Policies | Liquidity Constraints | Rural Development | TrustAdditional physical formats: Cole, Shawn.: Barriers to household risk management.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? This paper uses a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. The analysis finds that demand is significantly price-elastic, but that even if insurance were offered with payout ratios similar to US, widespread coverage would not be achieved. The paper identifies key non-price frictions that limit demand: liquidity constraints, particularly among poor households, lack of trust, and limited salience. The authors suggest potential improvements in contract design to mitigate these frictions.
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Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? This paper uses a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. The analysis finds that demand is significantly price-elastic, but that even if insurance were offered with payout ratios similar to US, widespread coverage would not be achieved. The paper identifies key non-price frictions that limit demand: liquidity constraints, particularly among poor households, lack of trust, and limited salience. The authors suggest potential improvements in contract design to mitigate these frictions.

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