Stigma and the Take-Up of Social Programs [electronic resource] / Ewoudou, Jacques
Material type: TextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2009Description: 1 online resource (18 p.)Subject(s): Aggregate demand | Benefits | Common Property Resource Development | Community Development and Empowerment | Currencies and Exchange Rates | Econometrics | Economic research | Economic theory | Economic Theory and Research | Education | Effective Schools and Teachers | Failures | Finance and Financial Sector Development | Game theory | Gender | Gender and Law | Incentives | Income | Law and Development | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | Nash equilibrium | Outcomes | Participation | Political economy | Public | Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures | Public Sector Management and Reform | Rural Development | Social Development | Strategic complementarities | Subnational Governance | Urban Development | Urban Governance and Management | Utility | Utility function | Wealth | Welfare | Welfare systemAdditional physical formats: Ewoudou, Jacques.: Stigma and the Take-Up of Social Programs.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: Empirical studies send mixed messages as to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that stigma and program participation are likely to be jointly determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation in a program, stigma is likely to be lower (higher) due at least in part to that high (low) degree of participation. This is because the more eligible persons participate, the less one can single out specific individuals for stigma because they use the program. This note suggests this theoretically with a simple model showing that we may have in an idealized setting two equilibria: one with stigma and zero participation in a social program, and one with perfect participation and no stigma.Empirical studies send mixed messages as to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that stigma and program participation are likely to be jointly determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation in a program, stigma is likely to be lower (higher) due at least in part to that high (low) degree of participation. This is because the more eligible persons participate, the less one can single out specific individuals for stigma because they use the program. This note suggests this theoretically with a simple model showing that we may have in an idealized setting two equilibria: one with stigma and zero participation in a social program, and one with perfect participation and no stigma.
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