Litigation and Settlement [electronic resource] : New Evidence From Labor Courts in Mexico / Kaplan, David S.

By: Kaplan, David SContributor(s): Kaplan, David S | Sadka, Joyce | Silva-Mendez, Jorge LuisMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2007Description: 1 online resource (40 p.)Subject(s): Arbitration | Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | Claim | Finance and Financial Sector Development | Information Security and Privacy | Judgments | Labor Courts | Labor Markets | Law and Development | Law Enforcement Systems | Legal Environment | Multiple Claimants | Private Law | Private Parties | Public Disclosure | Settlement | Settlements | Social Protections and LaborAdditional physical formats: Kaplan, David S.: Litigation and Settlement.Online resources: Click here to access online Abstract: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
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Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.

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