Smart Security Council? -- Table of contents -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Research questions -- 1.2 Relevancy of the topic -- 1.2.1 Empirical relevancy -- 1.2.2 Theoretical relevancy -- 1.3 Research design -- 1.4 Case selection -- 1.5 Limitations of the analysis -- 1.6 Structure of the book -- 2. Theoretical framework -- 2.1 Defining terms -- 2.2 Constructivism in International Relations theory -- 2.3 The concept of legitimacy -- 2.3.1 Different assumptions about legitimacy -- 2.3.2 Input legitimacy -- 2.3.3. Output legitimacy -- 2.4 Setting up the chain of causation -- 3. Empirical framework -- 3.1 The Security Council as a collective: broadening the input dimension -- 3.2 Sanctions in comparative perspective -- 3.2.1 From conventional to smart sanctions -- 3.2.2 Norm-enforcement and smart sanctions: broadening the output dimension -- 3.3 Combining theoretical and empirical framework -- 4. The case of Iran -- 4.1 The Security Council's involvement since 2006 -- 4.2 Examining the input dimension -- 4.2.1 Process and procedure -- 4.2.2 Values and symbols -- 4.2.3 Knowledge and specialization -- 4.2.4 Persuasion and reasonability -- 4.3. Examining the output dimension -- 4.3.1 Norm-object -- 4.3.2 Norm-depth -- 4.3.3 Norm-addressee -- 4.3.4 Norm-internalization -- 4.3.5 Norm-institutionalization -- 4.4 Effectiveness of the sanctions regime -- 5. The case of North Korea -- 5.1 The Security Council's involvement since 2006 -- 5.2 Examining the input dimension -- 5.2.1 Process and procedure -- 5.2.2 Values and symbols -- 5.2.3 Knowledge and specialization -- 5.2.4 Persuasion and reasonability -- 5.3. Examining the output dimension -- 5.3.1 Norm-object -- 5.3.2 Norm-depth -- 5.3.3 Norm-addressee -- 5.3.4 Norm-internalization -- 5.3.5 Norm-institutionalization.

5.4 Effectiveness of the sanctions regime -- 6. Conclusion and outlook -- 7. Bibliography -- 8. Appendix.

In 2004 the United Nations Security Council initiated a "Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions" in order to increase the Council's effectiveness in terms of sanctions implementation. With this reform, the Council reacted to the harsh criticism from the UN against the conventional sanctions practice. It was the Security Council's latest endeavor to make ratified sanctions more punitive, coercive, and thus effective as far as causing compliance within its judicial framework is concerned. Summarized under the term "smart sanctions", the Security Council tries to be more accurate in addressing sanctions thereby seeking not only to increase political effectiveness, but also to reduce unintended humanitarian suffering. While conventional sanctions are comprehensive and comprised of a variety of measures, such as trade boycotts and embargoes against the entire country, smart or targeted sanctions (as they are also termed) are selective, targeting only at certain areas or individuals. Consequently, sanctions are the practical expression of the Council's sovereignty. The Council "lives and breathes" through the ratification of sanctions, so their corroboration and proper enforcement reflect the organization's vitality. In short, if sanctions fail, the Council fails. So far scholars have accentuated technical questions in their research, such as how to engage in a successful bargaining process and how to imply isolation. They further focused on examining the compliance rate of targeted states. What has been slightly ignored is a potentially poor commitment by states to enforce sanctions in the first place. Quite possibly, the Security Council lacks ratification (what I term input legitimacy) and enforcement (what I term output legitimacy) of smart sanctions. Consequently, the "effectiveness" of smart sanctions does not necessarily have to be linked

to the compliance rate of the targeted state. Instead, it might be connected to the commitment shown by the enforcing member states: the level of legitimacy granted to the Council and its tools. Two questions can be raised: How do member states contribute to the ratification and enforcement of smart sanctions? Has the use of smart sanctions increased the effectiveness of the UNSC as a sanctioning body? The concept of input/output legitimacy serves as a model for analyzing the member states' commitment and will to impose smart sanctions, thus developing an alternative understanding of the term "effectiveness". As the cases of Iran and North-Korea reveal, the ratification and enforcement of smart sanctions suffer legitimacy. This has ramifications both theoretically and empirically as it makes the concept of legitimacy a valuable tool for policy makers and reformists while simultaneously exposing substantial weaknesses of the new sanction practice.   Auszug aus dem Text Text Sample: Chapter 1.1, Research questions: The outgoing coverage of the SC's main problems and intrinsic contradictions induces questions concerning the performance of the organization. As Cortright and Lopez 2002 point out, sanctioning smartly is indeed an ambitious endeavor to make the Council more effective. Effective in both spheres of sanction's implementation: ,These twin impulses, to reduce unintended humanitarian consequences and enhance political effectiveness - have led to the use of targeted and selective sanctions.' Scholars have thereby predominately focused on evaluating the smartness of sanctions regarding political goals while taking the humanitarian effectiveness for granted. As a result, scholars accentuate technical questions in their research, such as examining the compliance rate of targeted states, how to engage in a successful bargaining process and how to

imply isolation. What has been slightly ignored though is the potentially poor commitment by states to enforce sanctions in the first place. As a matter of fact, regarding the continuous gridlock reform endeavors have been experienced for decades now , it seems more fruitful to look at what Eriksson 2008 conveys: ,In the end, targeted sanctions are just as precise as decision-makers and practitioners want them to be. Consequently, that these steps, or some similar to them, have not been implemented before now reflects broader questions of political will and institutional inertia, even a degree of ambiguity within the international community, regarding what senders actually want from the sanctions they impose. Quite possibly, the SC might suffer from a lack of legitimacy regarding the ratification (intrinsic legitimacy) and/or enforcement (extrinsic legitimacy) of smart sanctions. Hence, the first research question is: 1. How do member states contribute to the ratification (intrinsic legitimacy) and enforcement (extrinsic legitimacy) of smart sanctions? While these concerns have already fuelled reformist approaches by the UN itself, actual changes were made in terms of the organization's measures. Indeed, smart sanctions are a perfect example for the Council's reaction to a demand by the international community for higher effectiveness. However, since the Council is constituted of members out of the very same international community, the SC can be seen as what constructivists term a ,social collective'. Correspondingly, introducing smart sanctions as the prime tool to make the Council more effective represents a reconsideration of existing norms, thus seeking to re-legitimize the collective. According to constructivists, a social collective needs legitimacy to act most effectively. Interestingly, legitimacy in this sense is generated by the

collective itself. With regard to smart sanctions, it is now subject to discussion if and how smart sanctions actually promote legitimacy. Hence, taking into account what Werthes 2003 noted on such a collective and its power to punish might be most promising: ,It would appear that for effective and economical social control, provided the norm and penalty are fully comprehend, the status of the authority is of prime importance. Where there is commitment to a system, where it is valued for what it stands for and can provided, conformity to norms - even alien norms - may be forthcoming. But where the system and its norms are rejected (non-legitimized), there is no role for sanctions as indicators and their role as motivators becomes all-important'. It is therefore interesting to examine whether member states, due to their behavior, elevate or eviscerate the organization's legitimacy and what kinds of legitimacy actually result in a high/low rate of effectiveness of smart sanctions. Hence, the second research question is: 2. Has the use of smart sanctions increased the effectiveness of the UNSC as a sanctioning body? Accordingly, the hypothesis is that the introduction of targeting sanctions has not necessarily imparted higher effectiveness to the Council. The Council might rather benefit from a faster and more supported ratification process, howbeit the enforcement remains flawed. Although smart sanctions were formulated with the premise to make the SC more effective, it is quite possible that targeting sanctions, in the end, only contribute to strengthening the collective. That is quite contrary to what the P-5 had in mind when they developed the model of smart sanctions. Moreover, it is theoretically contrary to how scholars have been evaluating the UN so far. While it could be the case that smart sanctions enjoy a higher legitimacy within the

Council, they might not at all be enforced properly by all parties involved. However, both parts are inevitably connected with each other. Moreover - and as some scholars argue - sanctions often represent the last peaceful option, desperately aiming to prevent war. Mentioning this, it is important to consider that a failure of a sanctions regime might lead to unilateral action, thus undermining the effectiveness of the organization in the long run. This can be asserted as the second hypothesis. In the end, such a failure would also be evidence for the fact that smart sanctions - compare to conventional sanctions - do not necessarily differ regarding negative outcomes. 1.2, Relevancy of the topic: The topic is relevant for various reasons - some of them have already been mentioned in the introduction. The following two chapters will briefly present why an assessment with the legitimacy of the SC is important and thereby distinguishes between an empirical and a theoretically relevancy of the subject as such. 1.2.1, Empirical relevancy: The Council is the most powerful institution in the world that on the one hand, requires it to work effectively and on the other hand explains why it has been so thoroughly criticized. Sanctions are thereby the practical expression of the Council's sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the Council ,lives and breathes' through the ratification of sanctions. Hence, their corroboration and proper enforcement reflect the organization's vitality. As a consequence, sanctions have not only been seen as the most suitable tool to prevent war and maintain peace. They have also been perceived as the most important part of IOs in general, and the SC in particular. Sanctions and IOs are inevitably intertwined as Davis and Engerman underpin, that ,International cooperation not only reduces the political costs of applying sanctions,

but,.

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