Quality of Public Investment.

By: Chakraborty, ShankhaContributor(s): Dabla-Norris, EraMaterial type: TextTextSeries: IMF Working PapersPublisher: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2009Copyright date: ©2009Description: 1 online resource (25 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781451917291Subject(s): Economics | Public investmentsGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Quality of Public InvestmentDDC classification: 336.3 | 336.39 LOC classification: HC79.P83 -- C435 2009ebOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- Figure 1. Infrastructure Quality vs. Control of Corruption -- II. The Environment -- III. General Equilibrium -- IV. Discussion -- A. Micro versus Macro Evidence -- Table 1. Effective Output Elasticity of Public Capital -- B. Accounting for Income Gaps -- Table 2. Ratio of Quality-adjusted Public Capital -- Table 3. Steady-State Predictions for Output Gaps -- V. Conclusion -- Figure 2. Multiple Equilibria in Corruption -- References.
Summary: This paper develops a growth model with specialized goods where inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies interact with the provision of public investment services in affecting the productivity of private capital, specialization, and growth. The model provides potential explanations for the contradictory empirical results on the effects of public investment found in the literature as well as for the role of the quality of public infrastructure investment in creating a gap between rich and poor countries. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that the link between public investment and growth depends critically on the quality and efficiency of public capital.
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Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- Figure 1. Infrastructure Quality vs. Control of Corruption -- II. The Environment -- III. General Equilibrium -- IV. Discussion -- A. Micro versus Macro Evidence -- Table 1. Effective Output Elasticity of Public Capital -- B. Accounting for Income Gaps -- Table 2. Ratio of Quality-adjusted Public Capital -- Table 3. Steady-State Predictions for Output Gaps -- V. Conclusion -- Figure 2. Multiple Equilibria in Corruption -- References.

This paper develops a growth model with specialized goods where inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies interact with the provision of public investment services in affecting the productivity of private capital, specialization, and growth. The model provides potential explanations for the contradictory empirical results on the effects of public investment found in the literature as well as for the role of the quality of public infrastructure investment in creating a gap between rich and poor countries. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that the link between public investment and growth depends critically on the quality and efficiency of public capital.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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