Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?.

By: Mishra, PrachiContributor(s): Facchini, Giovanni | Mayda, Anna MariaMaterial type: TextTextSeries: IMF Working PapersPublisher: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2008Copyright date: ©2008Description: 1 online resource (58 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781452728896Subject(s): Lobbying -- United States -- Econometric models | United States -- Emigration and immigration -- Government policy -- Econometric modelsGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?DDC classification: 324.40973 LOC classification: JK1118 -- .F333 2008ebOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature -- III. Migration Policy in the United States -- IV. Theoretical Framework -- V. Data -- A. Lobbying Expenditures -- B. Other Data -- C. Summary Statistics -- VI. Empirical Analysis -- A. Main Results -- B. Additional Results -- C. Robustness Checks -- VII. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Number and Types of Non-Immigrant Visa Issuances, 2001-05 -- 2. Targeted Political Activity -- 3. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, OLS -- 4a. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables -- 4b. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables - First Stage -- 5. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Dependent Variables -- 6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Measure of Lobbying Expenditures -- 7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Campaign Contributions from PAC vs Lobbying Expenditures -- Figures -- 1. Scatter Plots Between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) -- 2. Top 10 Spenders for Immigration, 2001-05 -- 3. Top 10 Sectors with the Highest Number of Visas, 2001-05 -- 4. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of Visas -- 5. Scatter Plot - Union Membership Rates and Number of Visas -- 6. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of H1B Visas -- 7. Scatter Plot - Union Membership Rates and Number of H1B Visas -- References -- Appendix -- Appendix Figures -- A1. The Effects of a Migration Quota -- Appendix Tables -- A1a. Summary Statistics -- A1b. Summary Statistics (in levels) -- A2. List of Issues -- A3. Sample Lobbying Report - Morrison Public Affairs Group -- A4. Sample Lobbying Report - Microsoft Corporation -- A5. List of CPS Industries (Census Bureau Classification).
A6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks -- A7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks.
Summary: While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.
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Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature -- III. Migration Policy in the United States -- IV. Theoretical Framework -- V. Data -- A. Lobbying Expenditures -- B. Other Data -- C. Summary Statistics -- VI. Empirical Analysis -- A. Main Results -- B. Additional Results -- C. Robustness Checks -- VII. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Number and Types of Non-Immigrant Visa Issuances, 2001-05 -- 2. Targeted Political Activity -- 3. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, OLS -- 4a. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables -- 4b. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables - First Stage -- 5. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Dependent Variables -- 6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Measure of Lobbying Expenditures -- 7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Campaign Contributions from PAC vs Lobbying Expenditures -- Figures -- 1. Scatter Plots Between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) -- 2. Top 10 Spenders for Immigration, 2001-05 -- 3. Top 10 Sectors with the Highest Number of Visas, 2001-05 -- 4. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of Visas -- 5. Scatter Plot - Union Membership Rates and Number of Visas -- 6. Scatter Plot - Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of H1B Visas -- 7. Scatter Plot - Union Membership Rates and Number of H1B Visas -- References -- Appendix -- Appendix Figures -- A1. The Effects of a Migration Quota -- Appendix Tables -- A1a. Summary Statistics -- A1b. Summary Statistics (in levels) -- A2. List of Issues -- A3. Sample Lobbying Report - Morrison Public Affairs Group -- A4. Sample Lobbying Report - Microsoft Corporation -- A5. List of CPS Industries (Census Bureau Classification).

A6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks -- A7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks.

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2018. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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