Why Follow the Leader? (Record no. 24692)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02421cam a22003494a 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6179
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field The World Bank
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field m d
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
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008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 020129s2012 dcu i001 0 eng
024 8# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1596/1813-9450-6179
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (The World Bank)6179
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Keefer, Philip
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Why Follow the Leader?
Medium [electronic resource] :
Remainder of title Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict /
Statement of responsibility, etc Philip Keefer
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Washington, D.C.,
Name of publisher, distributor, etc The World Bank,
Date of publication, distribution, etc 2012
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (24 p.)
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Most analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians: leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by which state capacity is created and a specific reason to regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest.
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Armed Conflict
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Civil war
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Collective action
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Conflict
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Credible commitment
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element International Terrorism & Counterterrorism
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Labor Policies
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Peace & Peacekeeping
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Post Conflict Reconstruction
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Keefer, Philip
776 18 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Main entry heading Print version:
Display text Keefer, Philip
Title Why Follow the Leader?
Place, publisher, and date of publication Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2012
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Policy research working papers.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title World Bank e-Library.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6179">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6179</a>

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