Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking (Record no. 24641)

000 -LEADER
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001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6146
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field The World Bank
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS--GENERAL INFORMATION
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007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
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008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 020129s2012 dcu i001 0 eng
024 8# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1596/1813-9450-6146
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (The World Bank)6146
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Cole, Shawn
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking
Medium [electronic resource] :
Remainder of title Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers /
Statement of responsibility, etc Shawn Cole
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Washington, D.C.,
Name of publisher, distributor, etc The World Bank,
Date of publication, distribution, etc 2012
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (68 p.)
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. The paper first shows that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by loan officers. Second, the paper presents direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Access to Finance
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Banking
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Banks & Banking Reform
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Debt Markets
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Emerging markets
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Finance and Financial Sector Development
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Loan officer incentives
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Microfinance
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Private Sector Development
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Cole, Shawn
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Kanz, Martin
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Klapper, Leora
776 18 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Main entry heading Print version:
Display text Cole, Shawn
Title Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking.
Place, publisher, and date of publication Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2012
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Policy research working papers.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title World Bank e-Library.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6146">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6146</a>

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