Environmental Policy and Time Consistency (Record no. 138150)

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001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 2351
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field The World Bank
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS--GENERAL INFORMATION
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007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
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024 8# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1596/1813-9450-2351
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (The World Bank)2351
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Kennedy, W. Peter
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Environmental Policy and Time Consistency
Medium [electronic resource] :
Remainder of title Emissions Taxes and Emissions Trading /
Statement of responsibility, etc Kennedy, W. Peter
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Washington, D.C.,
Name of publisher, distributor, etc The World Bank,
Date of publication, distribution, etc 1999
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (48 p.)
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc May 2000 - As instruments for controlling pollution, how do emissions taxes and emissions trading compare in terms of the incentives they create to adopt cleaner technologies? Emissions taxes may have a slight advantage over emissions trading. Kennedy and Laplante examine policy problems related to the use of emissions taxes and emissions trading, two market-based instruments for controlling pollution by getting regulated firms to adopt cleaner technologies. By attaching an explicit price to emissions, these instruments give firms an incentive to continually reduce their volume of emissions. Command-and-control emissions standards create incentives to adopt cleaner technologies only up to the point where the standards are no longer binding (at which point the shadow price on emissions falls to zero). But the ongoing incentives created by market-based instruments are not necessarily right, either. Time-consistency constraints on the setting of these instruments limit the regulator's ability to set policies that lead to efficiency in adopting technology options. After examining the time-consistency properties of a Pigouvian emissions tax and of emissions trading, Kennedy and Laplante find that: If damage is linear, efficiency in adopting technologies involves either universal adoption of the new technology or universal retention of the old technology, depending on the cost of adoption. The first-best tax policy and the first-best permit-supply policy are both time-consistent under these conditions; If damage is strictly convex, efficiency may require partial adoption of the new technology. In this case, the first-best tax policy is not time-consistent and the tax rate must be adjusted after adoption has taken place (ratcheting). Ratcheting will induce an efficient equilibrium if there is a very large number of firms. If there are relatively few firms, ratcheting creates too many incentives to adopt the new technology; The first-best supply policy is time-consistent if there is a very large number of firms. If there are relatively few firms, the first-best supply policy may not be time-consistent, and the regulator must ratchet the supply of permits. With this policy, there are not enough incentives for firms to adopt the new technology. The results do not strongly favor one policy instrument over the other, but if the point of an emissions trading program is to increase technological efficiency, it is necessary to continually adjust the supply of permits in response to technological change, even when damage is linear. This continual adjustment is not needed for an emissions tax when damage is linear, which may give emissions taxes an advantage over emissions trading. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the economics of pollution control. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Benoit Laplante may be contacted at blaplante@worldbank.org.
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Aggregate Emissions
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Damage Function
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Efficiency
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Emission Standards
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Emission Taxes
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Emissions
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Environment
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Environmental
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Environmental Economics and Policies
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Environmental Policy
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Forest Management
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element ICT Policy and Strategies
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Incentives
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Industry
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Information and Communication Technologies
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Policies
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Policy Instruments
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element Pollution
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Pollution Control
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Pollution Management and Control
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Pollution Reduction
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Production
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Technological Change
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Technology
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Technology Adoption
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Technology Industry
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Kennedy, W. Peter
776 18 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Main entry heading Print version:
Display text Kennedy, W. Peter.
Title Environmental Policy and Time Consistency.
Place, publisher, and date of publication Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1999
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Policy research working papers.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title World Bank e-Library.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-2351">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-2351</a>

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