Wiegand, Johannes.
Fiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone The Case of the CEMAC / Johannes Wiegand. [electronic resource] : Johannes Wiegand. - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. - 1 online resource (26 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 04/8 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 04/8 .
This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
1451842546 : 15.00 USD
1018-5941
10.5089/9781451842548.001 doi
Energy: Government Policy
Fiscal Balance
Macroeconomic Surveillance
National Deficit Surplus
Oil Prices
Petroleum Production
Cameroon
Congo
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Equatorial Guinea
Fiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone The Case of the CEMAC / Johannes Wiegand. [electronic resource] : Johannes Wiegand. - Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004. - 1 online resource (26 p.) - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 04/8 . - IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 04/8 .
This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
1451842546 : 15.00 USD
1018-5941
10.5089/9781451842548.001 doi
Energy: Government Policy
Fiscal Balance
Macroeconomic Surveillance
National Deficit Surplus
Oil Prices
Petroleum Production
Cameroon
Congo
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Equatorial Guinea